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Revision 1.23: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Sun Apr 20 19:15:42 2025 UTC (18 months, 3 weeks ago) by wiz
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2026Q3-base, pkgsrc-2026Q3, pkgsrc-2026Q2-base, pkgsrc-2026Q2, pkgsrc-2026Q1-base, pkgsrc-2026Q1, pkgsrc-2025Q4-base, pkgsrc-2025Q4, pkgsrc-2025Q3-base, pkgsrc-2025Q3, pkgsrc-2025Q2-base, pkgsrc-2025Q2, HEAD
Diff to: previous 1.22: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.22: +2 -1 lines
openssh: update to 10.0p1.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * This release removes support for the weak DSA signature
   algorithm, completing the deprecation process that began in
   2015 (when DSA was disabled by default) and repeatedly warned
   over the last 12 months.

 * scp(1), sftp(1): pass "ControlMaster no" to ssh when invoked by
   scp & sftp. This disables implicit session creation by these
   tools when ControlMaster was set to yes/auto by configuration,
   which some users found surprising. This change will not prevent
   scp/sftp from using an existing multiplexing session if one had
   already been created. GHPR557

 * This release has the version number 10.0 and announces itself
   as "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_10.0". Software that naively matches
   versions using patterns like "OpenSSH_1*" may be confused by
   this.

 * sshd(8): this release removes the code responsible for the
   user authentication phase of the protocol from the per-
   connection sshd-session binary to a new sshd-auth binary.
   Splitting this code into a separate binary ensures that the
   crucial pre-authentication attack surface has an entirely
   disjoint address space from the code used for the rest of the
   connection. It also yields a small runtime memory saving as the
   authentication code will be unloaded after the authentication
   phase completes. This change should be largely invisible to
   users, though some log messages may now come from "sshd-auth"
   instead of "sshd-session". Downstream distributors of OpenSSH
   will need to package the sshd-auth binary.

 * sshd(8): this release disables finite field (a.k.a modp)
   Diffie-Hellman key exchange in sshd by default. Specifically,
   this removes the "diffie-hellman-group*" and
   "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-*" methods from the default
   KEXAlgorithms list. The client is unchanged and continues to
   support these methods by default. Finite field Diffie Hellman
   is slow and computationally expensive for the same security
   level as Elliptic Curve DH or PQ key agreement while offering
   no redeeming advantages. ECDH has been specified for the SSH
   protocol for 15 years and some form of ECDH has been the default
   key exchange in OpenSSH for the last 14 years.

 * sshd(8): this release removes the implicit fallback to compiled-
   in groups for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange KEX when the moduli
   file exists but does not contain moduli within the client-
   requested range.  The fallback behaviour remains for the case
   where the moduli file does not exist at all. This allows
   administrators more explicit control over which DH groups will
   be selected, but can lead to connection failures if the moduli
   file is edited incorrectly. bz#2793

Changes since OpenSSH 9.9
=========================

This release contains a minor security fix as well as a number of
feature improvements and bugfixes.

Security
========

* sshd(8): fix the DisableForwarding directive, which was failing
  to disable X11 forwarding and agent forwarding as documented.
  X11 forwarding is disabled by default in the server and agent
  forwarding is off by default in the client.

New features
------------

 * ssh(1): the hybrid post-quantum algorithm mlkem768x25519-sha256
   is now used by default for key agreement. This algorithm is
   considered to be safe against attack by quantum computers,
   is guaranteed to be no less strong than the popular
   curve25519-sha256 algorithm, has been standardised by NIST
   and is considerably faster than the previous default.

 * ssh(1): prefer AES-GCM to AES-CTR mode when selecting a cipher
   for the connection. The default cipher preference list is now
   Chacha20/Poly1305, AES-GCM (128/256) followed by AES-CTR
   (128/192/256).

 * ssh(1): add %-token and environment variable expansion to the
   ssh_config SetEnv directive.

 * ssh(1): allow %-token and environment variable expansion in
   the ssh_config User directive, with the exception of %r and %C
   which would be self-referential. bz#3477

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add "Match version" support to ssh_config and
   sshd_config. Allows matching on the local version of OpenSSH,
   e.g. "Match version OpenSSH_10.*".

 * ssh(1): add support for "Match sessiontype" to ssh_config.
   Allows matching on the type of session initially requested,
   either "shell" for interactive sessions, "exec" for command
   execution sessions, "subsystem" for subsystem requests, such as
   sftp, or "none" for transport/forwarding-only sessions.

 * ssh(1): add support for "Match command ..." support to
   ssh_config, allowing matching on the remote command as specified
   on the command-line.

 * ssh(1): allow 'Match tagged ""' and 'Match command ""' to match
   empty tag and command values respectively.

 * sshd(8): allow glob(3) patterns to be used in sshd_config
   AuthorizedKeysFile and AuthorizedPrincipalsFile directives.
   bz2755

 * sshd(1): support the VersionAddendum in the client, mirroring
   the option of the same name in the server; bz2745

 * ssh-agent(1): the agent will now delete all loaded keys when
   signaled with SIGUSR1. This allows deletion of keys without
   having access to $SSH_AUTH_SOCK.

 * Portable OpenSSH, ssh-agent(1): support systemd-style socket
   activation in ssh-agent using the LISTEN_PID/LISTEN_FDS
   mechanism. Activated when these environment variables are set,
   the agent is started with the -d or -D option and no socket path
   is set. GHPR502

 * ssh-keygen(1): support FIDO tokens that return no attestation
   data, e.g. recent WinHello. GHPR542

 * ssh-agent(1): add a "-Owebsafe-allow=..." option to allow the
   default FIDO application ID allow-list to be overridden.

 * Add a work-in-progress tool to verify FIDO attestation blobs
   that ssh-keygen can optionally write when enrolling FIDO keys.
   This tool is available under regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation
   for experimentation but is not installed by "make install".

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow "-" as output file for moduli screening.
   GHPR393

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): remove assumption that the sshd_config and any configs
   it includes can fit in a (possibly enlarged) socket buffer.
   Previously it was possible to create a sufficiently large
   configuration that could cause sshd to fail to accept any
   connection. sshd(8) will now actively manage sending its config
   to the sshd-session sub-process.

 * ssh(1): don't start the ObscureKeystrokeTiming mitigations if
   there has been traffic on a X11 forwarding channel recently.
   Should fix X11 forwarding performance problems when this setting
   is enabled. bz3655

 * ssh(1): prohibit the comma character in hostnames accepted, but
   allow an underscore as the first character in a hostname.

 * sftp(1): set high-water when resuming a "put". Prevents bogus
   "server reordered acks" debug message.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix regression in openssh-9.8, which would fail
   to accept "Match criteria=argument" as well as the documented
   "Match criteria argument" syntax in ssh_config and sshd_config.
   bz3739

 * sftp(1), ssh(1): fix a number possible NULL dereference bugs,
   including Coverity CIDs 405019 and 477813.

 * sshd(8): fix PerSourcePenalty incorrectly using "crash" penalty
   when LoginGraceTime was exceeded. bz3797

 * sshd(8): fix "Match invalid-user" from incorrectly being
   activated in initial configuration pass when no other predicates
   were present on the match line

 * sshd(8): fix debug logging of user specific delay. GHPR#552

 * sshd(8): improve debug logging across sub-process boundaries.
   Previously some log messages were lost early in the sshd-auth and
   sshd-session processes' life.

 * ssh(1): require control-escape character sequences passed via
   the '-e ^x' command-line to be exactly two characters long. Avoids
   one byte out-of-bounds read if ssh is invoked as "ssh -e^ ..."
   GHPR368

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): prevent integer overflow in x11 port handling.
   These are theoretically possible if the admin misconfigured
   X11DisplayOffset or the user misconfigures their own $DISPLAY,
   but don't happen in normal operation. bz#3730

 * ssh-keygen(1): don't mess up ssh-keygen -l output when the file
   contains CR characters; GHPR236 bz3385.

 * sshd(8): add rate limits to logging of connections dropped by
   PerSourcePenalties. Previously these could be noisy in logs.

 * ssh(1): fix argument of "Compression" directive in ssh -G config
   dump, which regressed in openssh-9.8.

 * sshd(8): fix a corner-case triggered by UpdateHostKeys when sshd
   refuses to accept the signature returned by an agent holding host
   keys during the hostkey rotation sub-protocol. This situation
   could occur in situations where a PKCS#11 smartcard that lacked
   support for particular signature algorithms was used to store
   host keys.

 * ssh-keygen(1): when using RSA keys to sign messages with
   "ssh-keygen -Y", select the signature algorithm based on the
   requested hash algorithm ("-Ohashalg=xxx"). This allows using
   something other than the default of rsa-sha2-512, which may not
   be supported on all signing backends, e.g. some smartcards only
   support SHA256.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keyscan(1): fix ML-KEM768x25519 KEX on
   big-endian systems.

 * Many regression and interop test improvements.

Portability
-----------

 * All: add support for AWS-LC (AWS libcrypto). bz3784

 * sshd(8): add wtmpdb support as a Y2038 safe wtmp replacement.

 * sshd(8): add support for locking sshd into memory, enabled with
   the --with-linux-memlock-onfault configure flag.

 * Add support for building a standalone sk-libfido2 library,
   enabled by --with-security-key-standalone

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keyscan(1): include __builtin_popcount
   replacement function. for compilers that lack it.

 * All: Check for and replace le32toh, le64toh, htole64 separately.
   It appears that at least some versions of endian.h in glibc do
   not have the latter two. bz#3794

 * Remove ancient RHL 6.x config in RPM spec.

Revision 1.22: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Jul 23 06:37:00 2024 UTC (2 years, 3 months ago) by wiz
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2025Q1-base, pkgsrc-2025Q1, pkgsrc-2024Q4-base, pkgsrc-2024Q4, pkgsrc-2024Q3-base, pkgsrc-2024Q3
Diff to: previous 1.21: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.21: +1 -2 lines
openssh: finish removal of macports changes

Revision 1.20.34.1: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Jul 2 06:32:11 2024 UTC (2 years, 4 months ago) by bsiegert
Branches: pkgsrc-2024Q2
Diff to: previous 1.20: preferred, colored; next MAIN 1.21: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.20: +1 -0 lines
Pullup ticket #6874 - requested by wiz
security/openssh: security fix (RCE)

Revisions pulled up:
- security/openssh/Makefile                                     1.283
- security/openssh/PLIST                                        1.21
- security/openssh/distinfo                                     1.123
- security/openssh/patches/patch-Makefile.in                    1.8
- security/openssh/patches/patch-clientloop.c                   1.6
- security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in                    deleted
- security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac                   1.10
- security/openssh/patches/patch-defines.h                      1.5
- security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c                     deleted
- security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_openbsd-compat.h deleted
- security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c      deleted
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sandbox-darwin.c               1.3
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd-session.c                 1.1
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.8                         deleted
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c                         deleted

---
   Module Name:	pkgsrc
   Committed By:	wiz
   Date:		Mon Jul  1 09:19:40 UTC 2024

   Modified Files:
   	pkgsrc/security/openssh: Makefile PLIST distinfo
   	pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches: patch-Makefile.in patch-clientloop.c
   	    patch-configure.ac patch-defines.h patch-sandbox-darwin.c
   Added Files:
   	pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches: patch-sshd-session.c
   Removed Files:
   	pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches: patch-config.h.in patch-loginrec.c
   	    patch-openbsd-compat_openbsd-compat.h
   	    patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c patch-sshd.8 patch-sshd.c

   Log Message:
   openssh: update to 9.8p1.

   pkgsrc changes:

   Remove outdated or undocumented patches.

   Remove Interix support.

   Remove tcp_wrappers support - does not apply cleanly to this
   version and arguable, if we even should have such a big patch for openssh in pkgsrc.

   Updated Apple patches from macPorts.

   Upstream Changes:

   Security
   ========

   This release contains fixes for two security problems, one critical
   and one minor.

   1) Race condition in sshd(8)

   A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH
   versions 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code
   execution with root privileges.

   Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc
   systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on
   average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the
   server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be
   possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that
   these attacks will be improved upon.

   Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been
   examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux
   distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection
   ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't
   understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation.
   OpenBSD is not vulnerable.

   We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting
   and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing
   detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures.

   2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming

   In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected to an
   OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1)
   ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered this feature
   ineffective - a passive observer could still detect which network
   packets contained real keystrokes when the countermeasure was active
   because both fake and real keystroke packets were being sent
   unconditionally.

   This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also independently by
   Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the
   University of Cambridge Computer Lab.

   Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real keystroke
   packets broke another long-standing timing attack mitigation. Since
   OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke echo packets for
   traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, such as when entering a
   password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake
   keystroke echoes ineffective and could allow a passive observer of
   a SSH session to once again detect when echo was off and obtain
   fairly limited timing information about keystrokes in this situation
   (20ms granularity by default).

   This additional implication of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei
   En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we thank them
   for their detailed analysis.

   This bug does not affect connections when ObscureKeystrokeTiming
   was disabled or sessions where no TTY was requested.

   Potentially-incompatible changes
   --------------------------------

    * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now
      disabled at compile time.

    * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
      repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
      completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
      discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
      Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or
      servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
      proxies may need to consider these settings.

    * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8),
      and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much
      smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH
      protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege
      separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and
      disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further
      separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is
      planned for the future.

    * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
      log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
      named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".

    * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
      containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error.
      This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new
      "-q" flag to silence them altogether.

    * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0]
      as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5)
      directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This
      defaults to "sshd". bz2101

    * (portable OpenSSH only) Automatically-generated files, such as
      configure, config.h.in, etc will now be checked in to the portable
      OpenSSH git release branch (e.g. V_9_8). This should ensure that
      the contents of the signed release branch exactly match the
      contents of the signed release tarball.

Revision 1.21: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Mon Jul 1 09:19:40 2024 UTC (2 years, 4 months ago) by wiz
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.20: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.20: +2 -1 lines
openssh: update to 9.8p1.

pkgsrc changes:

Remove outdated or undocumented patches.

Remove Interix support.

Remove tcp_wrappers support - does not apply cleanly to this
version and arguable, if we even should have such a big patch for openssh in pkgsrc.

Updated Apple patches from macPorts.

Upstream Changes:

Security
========

This release contains fixes for two security problems, one critical
and one minor.

1) Race condition in sshd(8)

A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH
versions 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code
execution with root privileges.

Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc
systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on
average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the
server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be
possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that
these attacks will be improved upon.

Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been
examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux
distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection
ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't
understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation.
OpenBSD is not vulnerable.

We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting
and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing
detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures.

2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming

In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected to an
OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1)
ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered this feature
ineffective - a passive observer could still detect which network
packets contained real keystrokes when the countermeasure was active
because both fake and real keystroke packets were being sent
unconditionally.

This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also independently by
Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the
University of Cambridge Computer Lab.

Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real keystroke
packets broke another long-standing timing attack mitigation. Since
OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke echo packets for
traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, such as when entering a
password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake
keystroke echoes ineffective and could allow a passive observer of
a SSH session to once again detect when echo was off and obtain
fairly limited timing information about keystrokes in this situation
(20ms granularity by default).

This additional implication of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei
En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we thank them
for their detailed analysis.

This bug does not affect connections when ObscureKeystrokeTiming
was disabled or sessions where no TTY was requested.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now
   disabled at compile time.

 * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
   repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
   completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
   discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
   Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or
   servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
   proxies may need to consider these settings.

 * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8),
   and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much
   smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH
   protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege
   separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and
   disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further
   separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is
   planned for the future.

 * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
   log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
   named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".

 * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
   containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error.
   This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new
   "-q" flag to silence them altogether.

 * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0]
   as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5)
   directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This
   defaults to "sshd". bz2101

 * (portable OpenSSH only) Automatically-generated files, such as
   configure, config.h.in, etc will now be checked in to the portable
   OpenSSH git release branch (e.g. V_9_8). This should ensure that
   the contents of the signed release branch exactly match the
   contents of the signed release tarball.

Revision 1.20: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Wed May 27 13:49:27 2020 UTC (6 years, 5 months ago) by sevan
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2024Q2-base, pkgsrc-2024Q1-base, pkgsrc-2024Q1, pkgsrc-2023Q4-base, pkgsrc-2023Q4, pkgsrc-2023Q3-base, pkgsrc-2023Q3, pkgsrc-2023Q2-base, pkgsrc-2023Q2, pkgsrc-2023Q1-base, pkgsrc-2023Q1, pkgsrc-2022Q4-base, pkgsrc-2022Q4, pkgsrc-2022Q3-base, pkgsrc-2022Q3, pkgsrc-2022Q2-base, pkgsrc-2022Q2, pkgsrc-2022Q1-base, pkgsrc-2022Q1, pkgsrc-2021Q4-base, pkgsrc-2021Q4, pkgsrc-2021Q3-base, pkgsrc-2021Q3, pkgsrc-2021Q2-base, pkgsrc-2021Q2, pkgsrc-2021Q1-base, pkgsrc-2021Q1, pkgsrc-2020Q4-base, pkgsrc-2020Q4, pkgsrc-2020Q3-base, pkgsrc-2020Q3, pkgsrc-2020Q2-base, pkgsrc-2020Q2
Branch point for: pkgsrc-2024Q2
Diff to: previous 1.19: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.19: +3 -1 lines
Update to OpenSSH 8.3

OpenSSH 8.3 was released on 2020-05-27. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be
disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a
near-future release.

This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.

The better alternatives include:

 * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
   algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
   "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
   supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
   client and server support them.

 * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
   OpenSSH since release 6.5.

 * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
   have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.

To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm, for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:

    ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host

If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.

A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually. Vendors of devices
that implement the SSH protocol should ensure that they support the
new signature algorithms for RSA keys.

[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
    Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
    (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Security
========

 * scp(1): when receiving files, scp(1) could be become desynchronised
   if a utimes(2) system call failed. This could allow file contents
   to be interpreted as file metadata and thereby permit an adversary
   to craft a file system that, when copied with scp(1) in a
   configuration that caused utimes(2) to fail (e.g. under a SELinux
   policy or syscall sandbox), transferred different file names and
   contents to the actual file system layout.

   Exploitation of this is not likely as utimes(2) does not fail under
   normal circumstances. Successful exploitation is not silent - the
   output of scp(1) would show transfer errors followed by the actual
   file(s) that were received.

   Finally, filenames returned from the peer are (since openssh-8.0)
   matched against the user's requested destination, thereby
   disallowing a successful exploit from writing files outside the
   user's selected target glob (or directory, in the case of a
   recursive transfer). This ensures that this attack can achieve no
   more than a hostile peer is already able to achieve within the scp
   protocol.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * sftp(1): reject an argument of "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
   scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it.

Changes since OpenSSH 8.2
=========================

The focus of this release is bug fixing.

New Features
------------

 * sshd(8): make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" to ignore
   rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only"
   to allow .shosts files but not .rhosts.

 * sshd(8): allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
   sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148

 * ssh(1): add %TOKEN percent expansion for the LocalFoward and
   RemoteForward keywords when used for Unix domain socket forwarding.
   bz#3014

 * all: allow loading public keys from the unencrypted envelope of a
   private key file if no corresponding public key file is present.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): prefer to use chacha20 from libcrypto where
   possible instead of the (slower) portable C implementation included
   in OpenSSH.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add ability to dump the contents of a binary key
   revocation list via "ssh-keygen -lQf /path" bz#3132

Bugfixes
--------

 * ssh(1): fix IdentitiesOnly=yes to also apply to keys loaded from
   a PKCS11Provider; bz#3141

 * ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL dereference when trying to convert an
   invalid RFC4716 private key.

 * scp(1): when performing remote-to-remote copies using "scp -3",
   start the second ssh(1) channel with BatchMode=yes enabled to
   avoid confusing and non-deterministic ordering of prompts.

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): when signing a challenge using a FIDO token,
   perform hashing of the message to be signed in the middleware layer
   rather than in OpenSSH code. This permits the use of security key
   middlewares that perform the hashing implicitly, such as Windows
   Hello.

 * ssh(1): fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts
   files." bz#3149

 * ssh(1): make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding
   terminate the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled;
   bz#3116

 * ssh-keygen(1): fix printing of fingerprints on private keys and add
   a regression test for same.

 * sshd(8): document order of checking AuthorizedKeysFile (first) and
   AuthorizedKeysCommand (subsequently, if the file doesn't match);
   bz#3134

 * sshd(8): document that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are
   not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is
   root; bz#3148

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix NULL dereference in private certificate
   key parsing (oss-fuzz #20074).

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): more consistency between sets of %TOKENS are
   accepted in various configuration options.

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): improve error messages for some common
   PKCS#11 C_Login failure cases; bz#3130

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): make error messages for problems during SSH banner
   exchange consistent with other SSH transport-layer error messages
   and ensure they include the relevant IP addresses bz#3129

 * various: fix a number of spelling errors in comments and debug/error
   messages

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): when downloading FIDO2 resident keys
   from a token, don't prompt for a PIN until the token has told us
   that it needs one. Avoids double-prompting on devices that
   implement on-device authentication.

 * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): no-touch-required FIDO certificate option
   should be an extension, not a critical option.

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): offer a better error message
   when trying to use a FIDO key function and SecurityKeyProvider is
   empty.

 * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(8): ensure that a key lifetime fits within
   the values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer
   wraparound of the timeout values. bz#3119

 * ssh(1): detect and prevent trivial configuration loops when using
    ProxyJump. bz#3057.

Portability
-----------

 * Detect systems where signals flagged with SA_RESTART will interrupt
   select(2). POSIX permits implementations to choose whether
   select(2) will return when interrupted with a SA_RESTART-flagged
   signal, but OpenSSH requires interrupting behaviour.

 * Several compilation fixes for HP/UX and AIX.

 * On platforms that do not support setting process-wide routing
   domains (all excepting OpenBSD at present), fail to accept a
   configuration attempts to set one at process start time rather than
   fatally erroring at run time. bz#3126

 * Improve detection of egrep (used in regression tests) on platforms
   that offer a poor default one (e.g. Solaris).

 * A number of shell portability fixes for the regression tests.

 * Fix theoretical infinite loop in the glob(3) replacement
   implementation.

 * Fix seccomp sandbox compilation problems for some Linux
   configurations bz#3085

 * Improved detection of libfido2 and some compilation fixes for some
   configurations when --with-security-key-builtin is selected.

OpenSSH 8.2 was released on 2020-02-14. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 hash algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will
be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm that depends
on SHA-1 by default in a near-future release.

This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.

The better alternatives include:

 * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
   algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
   "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
   supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
   client and server support them.

 * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
   OpenSSH since release 6.5.

 * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
   have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.

To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:

    ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host

If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.

A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually.

[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
    Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
    (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Security
========

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa"
   (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
   (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will
   use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the
   ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates.

   Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1
   collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited
   time in which to craft a collision that yields them a valid
   certificate, far more than the relatively brief LoginGraceTime
   window that they have to forge a host key signature.

   The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically
   random) nonce value near the start of the certificate that should
   make exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context
   challenging, as the attacker does not have full control over the
   prefix that actually gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a
   demonstrably broken algorithm and futher improvements in attacks
   are highly likely.

   OpenSSH releases prior to 7.2 do not support the newer RSA/SHA2
   algorithms and will refuse to accept certificates signed by an
   OpenSSH 8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is
   explicitly selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa").
   Older clients/servers may use another CA key type such as
   ssh-ed25519 (supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the
   ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521 types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7)
   instead if they cannot be upgraded.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): the above removal of "ssh-rsa" from the accepted
   CASignatureAlgorithms list.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): this release removes diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
   from the default key exchange proposal for both the client and
   server.

 * ssh-keygen(1): the command-line options related to the generation
   and screening of safe prime numbers used by the
   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange algorithms have
   changed. Most options have been folded under the -O flag.

 * sshd(8): the sshd listener process title visible to ps(1) has
   changed to include information about the number of connections that
   are currently attempting authentication and the limits configured
   by MaxStartups.

 * ssh-sk-helper(8): this is a new binary. It is used by the FIDO/U2F
   support to provide address-space isolation for token middleware
   libraries (including the internal one). It needs to be installed
   in the expected path, typically under /usr/libexec or similar.

Changes since OpenSSH 8.1
=========================

This release contains some significant new features.

FIDO/U2F Support
----------------

This release adds support for FIDO/U2F hardware authenticators to
OpenSSH. U2F/FIDO are open standards for inexpensive two-factor
authentication hardware that are widely used for website
authentication.  In OpenSSH FIDO devices are supported by new public
key types "ecdsa-sk" and "ed25519-sk", along with corresponding
certificate types.

ssh-keygen(1) may be used to generate a FIDO token-backed key, after
which they may be used much like any other key type supported by
OpenSSH, so long as the hardware token is attached when the keys are
used. FIDO tokens also generally require the user explicitly authorise
operations by touching or tapping them.

Generating a FIDO key requires the token be attached, and will usually
require the user tap the token to confirm the operation:

  $ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
  Generating public/private ecdsa-sk key pair.
  You may need to touch your security key to authorize key generation.
  Enter file in which to save the key (/home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk):
  Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
  Enter same passphrase again:
  Your identification has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
  Your public key has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub

This will yield a public and private key-pair. The private key file
should be useless to an attacker who does not have access to the
physical token. After generation, this key may be used like any other
supported key in OpenSSH and may be listed in authorized_keys, added
to ssh-agent(1), etc. The only additional stipulation is that the FIDO
token that the key belongs to must be attached when the key is used.

FIDO tokens are most commonly connected via USB but may be attached
via other means such as Bluetooth or NFC. In OpenSSH, communication
with the token is managed via a middleware library, specified by the
SecurityKeyProvider directive in ssh/sshd_config(5) or the
$SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable for ssh-keygen(1) and
ssh-add(1). The API for this middleware is documented in the sk-api.h
and PROTOCOL.u2f files in the source distribution.

OpenSSH includes a middleware ("SecurityKeyProvider=internal") with
support for USB tokens. It is automatically enabled in OpenBSD and may
be enabled in portable OpenSSH via the configure flag
--with-security-key-builtin. If the internal middleware is enabled
then it is automatically used by default. This internal middleware
requires that libfido2 (https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its
dependencies be installed. We recommend that packagers of portable
OpenSSH enable the built-in middleware, as it provides the
lowest-friction experience for users.

Note: FIDO/U2F tokens are required to implement the ECDSA-P256
"ecdsa-sk" key type, but hardware support for Ed25519 "ed25519-sk" is
less common. Similarly, not all hardware tokens support some of the
optional features such as resident keys.

The protocol-level changes to support FIDO/U2F keys in SSH are
documented in the PROTOCOL.u2f file in the OpenSSH source
distribution.

There are a number of supporting changes to this feature:

 * ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option when generating
   FIDO-hosted keys, that disables their default behaviour of
   requiring a physical touch/tap on the token during authentication.
   Note: not all tokens support disabling the touch requirement.

 * sshd(8): add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive that
   collects miscellaneous public key authentication-related options
   for sshd(8). At present it supports only a single option
   "no-touch-required". This causes sshd to skip its default check for
   FIDO/U2F keys that the signature was authorised by a touch or press
   event on the token hardware.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option
   for authorized_keys and a similar extension for certificates. This
   option disables the default requirement that FIDO key signatures
   attest that the user touched their key to authorize them, mirroring
   the similar PubkeyAuthOptions sshd_config option.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add support for the writing the FIDO attestation
   information that is returned when new keys are generated via the
   "-O write-attestation=/path" option. FIDO attestation certificates
   may be used to verify that a FIDO key is hosted in trusted
   hardware. OpenSSH does not currently make use of this information,
   beyond optionally writing it to disk.

FIDO2 resident keys
-------------------

FIDO/U2F OpenSSH keys consist of two parts: a "key handle" part stored
in the private key file on disk, and a per-device private key that is
unique to each FIDO/U2F token and that cannot be exported from the
token hardware. These are combined by the hardware at authentication
time to derive the real key that is used to sign authentication
challenges.

For tokens that are required to move between computers, it can be
cumbersome to have to move the private key file first. To avoid this
requirement, tokens implementing the newer FIDO2 standard support
"resident keys", where it is possible to effectively retrieve the key
handle part of the key from the hardware.

OpenSSH supports this feature, allowing resident keys to be generated
using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O resident" flag. This will produce a
public/private key pair as usual, but it will be possible to retrieve
the private key part from the token later. This may be done using
"ssh-keygen -K", which will download all available resident keys from
the tokens attached to the host and write public/private key files
for them. It is also possible to download and add resident keys
directly to ssh-agent(1) without writing files to the file-system
using "ssh-add -K".

Resident keys are indexed on the token by the application string and
user ID. By default, OpenSSH uses an application string of "ssh:" and
an empty user ID. If multiple resident keys on a single token are
desired then it may be necessary to override one or both of these
defaults using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O application=" or "-O user="
options. Note: OpenSSH will only download and use resident keys whose
application string begins with "ssh:"

Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO token increases the likelihood
of an attacker being able to use a stolen token device. For this
reason, tokens should enforce PIN authentication before allowing
download of keys, and users should set a PIN on their tokens before
creating any resident keys.

Other New Features
------------------

 * sshd(8): add an Include sshd_config keyword that allows including
   additional configuration files via glob(3) patterns. bz2468

 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): make the LE (low effort) DSCP code point available
   via the IPQoS directive; bz2986,

 * ssh(1): when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
   comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the
   comment. bz2564

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1): expose PKCS#11 key labels and X.509
   subjects as key comments, rather than simply listing the PKCS#11
   provider library path. PR138

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): make zlib compile-time optional, available via the
   Makefile.inc ZLIB flag on OpenBSD or via the --with-zlib configure
   option for OpenSSH portable.

 * sshd(8): when clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
   notification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to
   RFC4253 section 4.2.

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): when invoking the $SSH_ASKPASS prompt
   program, pass a hint to the program to describe the type of
   desired prompt.  The possible values are "confirm" (indicating
   that a yes/no confirmation dialog with no text entry should be
   shown), "none" (to indicate an informational message only), or
   blank for the original ssh-askpass behaviour of requesting a
   password/phrase.

 * ssh(1): allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
   specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent
   option to accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment
   variable in addition to yes/no.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add a new signature operations "find-principals" to
   look up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-
   signers file.

 * sshd(8): expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
   along with the MaxStartups limit in the process title visible to
   "ps".

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): make ClientAliveCountMax=0 have sensible semantics: it
   will now disable connection killing entirely rather than the
   current behaviour of instantly killing the connection after the
   first liveness test regardless of success. bz2627

 * sshd(8): clarify order of AllowUsers / DenyUsers vs AllowGroups /
   DenyGroups in the sshd(8) manual page. bz1690

 * sshd(8): better describe HashKnownHosts in the manual page. bz2560

 * sshd(8): clarify that that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name or
   address translation in the manual page. bz3099

 * sshd(8): allow the UpdateHostKeys feature to function when
   multiple known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys,
   ssh will now search subsequent known_hosts files, but will add
   updated host keys to the first specified file only. bz2738

 * All: replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
   sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the
   handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART
   which should reduce the potential for short read/write operations.

 * sftp(1): fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could
   turn in to a kill(-1); bz3084

 * sshd(8): fix a case where valid (but extremely large) SSH channel
   IDs were being incorrectly rejected. bz3098

 * ssh(1): when checking host key fingerprints as answers to new
   hostkey prompts, ignore whitespace surrounding the fingerprint
   itself.

 * All: wait for file descriptors to be readable or writeable during
   non-blocking connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when
   the server doesn't immediately send a banner (e.g. multiplexers
   like sslh)

 * sshd_config(5): document the sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
   key exchange algorithm. PR#151

Portability
-----------

 * sshd(8): multiple adjustments to the Linux seccomp sandbox:
   - Non-fatally deny IPC syscalls in sandbox
   - Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox (MIPS / glibc >= 2.31)
   - Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in sandbox (ARM) bz3100
   - Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox (recent glibc) bz3093

 * Explicit check for memmem declaration and fix up declaration if the
   system headers lack it. bz3102

OpenSSH 8.1 was released on 2019-10-09. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Security
========

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer
   overflow bug was found in the private key parsing code for the XMSS
   key type. This key type is still experimental and support for it is
   not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf option exists in
   portable OpenSSH to enable it. This bug was found by Adam Zabrocki
   and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add protection for private keys at
   rest in RAM against speculation and memory side-channel attacks like
   Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This release encrypts private keys
   when they are not in use with a symmetric key that is derived from a
   relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB).

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with
   an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
   Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible
   with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is
   overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").

Changes since OpenSSH 8.0
=========================

This release is focused on bug-fixing.

New Features
------------

 * ssh(1): Allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the
   default set by starting the list with the '^' character, E.g.
   "HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519"

 * ssh-keygen(1): add an experimental lightweight signature and
   verification ability. Signatures may be made using regular ssh keys
   held on disk or stored in a ssh-agent and verified against an
   authorized_keys-like list of allowed keys. Signatures embed a
   namespace that prevents confusion and attacks between different
   usage domains (e.g. files vs email).

 * ssh-keygen(1): print key comment when extracting public key from a
   private key.  bz#3052

 * ssh-keygen(1): accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys
   in known hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching
   host's random-art signature too. bz#3003

 * All: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of private
   keys to disk.  The OpenSSH native key format remains the default,
   but PKCS8 is a superior format to PEM if interoperability with
   non-OpenSSH software is required, as it may use a less insecure
   key derivation function than PEM's.

Bugfixes
--------

 * ssh(1): if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
   refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430

 * ssh(1): produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set
   incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791

 * sftp(1): allow the maximum uint32 value for the argument passed
   to -b which allows better error messages from later validation.
   bz#3050

 * ssh(1): avoid pledge sandbox violations in some combinations of
   remote forwarding, connection multiplexing and ControlMaster.

 * ssh-keyscan(1): include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX
   proposal; allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that
   disable old SHA1 ssh-rsa. bz#3029

 * sftp(1): print explicit "not modified" message if a file was
   requested for resumed download but was considered already complete.
   bz#2978

 * sftp(1): fix a typo and make <esc><right> move right to the
   closest end of a word just like <esc><left> moves left to the
   closest beginning of a word.

 * sshd(8): cap the number of permitopen/permitlisten directives
   allowed to appear on a single authorized_keys line.

 * All: fix a number of memory leaks (one-off or on exit paths).

 * Regression tests: a number of fixes and improvements, including
   fixes to the interop tests, adding the ability to run most tests
   on builds that disable OpenSSL support, better support for running
   tests under Valgrind and a number of bug-fixes.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): check for convtime() refusing to accept times that
   resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977

 * ssh(1): slightly more instructive error message when the user
   specifies multiple -J options on the command-line. bz3015

 * ssh-agent(1): process agent requests for RSA certificate private
   keys using correct signature algorithm when requested. bz3016

 * sftp(1): check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This
   allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path.  bz#2999

 * sshd(8): enlarge format buffer size for certificate serial
   number so the log message can record any 64-bit integer without
   truncation. bz#3012

 * sshd(8): for PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to
   be able to more easily ascertain the source of the request. Add the
   same logging for PermitListen violations which where not previously
   logged at all.

 * scp(1), sftp(1): use the correct POSIX format style for left
   justification for the transfer progress meter. bz#3002

 * sshd(8) when examining a configuration using sshd -T, assume any
   attribute not provided by -C does not match, which allows it to work
   when sshd_config contains a Match directive with or without -C.
   bz#2858

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no
   slots" warning from log level error to debug. This is common when
   attempting to enumerate keys on smartcard readers with no cards
   plugged in. bz#3058

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): do not unconditionally log in to PKCS#11
   tokens. Avoids spurious PIN prompts for keys not selected for
   authentication in ssh(1) and when listing public keys available in
   a token using ssh-keygen(1). bz#3006

Portability
-----------

 * ssh(1): fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for multiplexed sessions
   bz#3030

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF

 * sshd(8): add no-op implementation of pam_putenv to avoid build
   breakage on platforms where the PAM implementation lacks this
   function (e.g. HP-UX). bz#3008

 * sftp-server(8): fix Solaris privilege sandbox from preventing
   the legacy sftp rename operation from working (was refusing to
   allow hard links to files owned by other users). bz#3036

 * All: add a proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X to avoid
   the need to brute-force close all high-numbered file descriptors.
   bz#3049

 * sshd(8): in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox, allow mprotect(2) with
   PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only. This syscall is used by some hardened
   heap allocators. Github PR#142

 * sshd(8): in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox, allow the s390-specific
   ioctl for ECC hardware support.

 * All: use "doc" man page format if the mandoc(1) tool is present on
   the system. Previously configure would not select the "doc" man
   page format if mandoc was present but nroff was not.

 * sshd(8): don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris; check
   if STREAMS modules are already installed on a pty before installing
   since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed
   already. Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal.
   bz#2945 and bz#2998,

Revision 1.19: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Thu Jan 19 03:50:53 2017 UTC (9 years, 9 months ago) by maya
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2020Q1-base, pkgsrc-2020Q1, pkgsrc-2019Q4-base, pkgsrc-2019Q4, pkgsrc-2019Q3-base, pkgsrc-2019Q3, pkgsrc-2019Q2-base, pkgsrc-2019Q2, pkgsrc-2019Q1-base, pkgsrc-2019Q1, pkgsrc-2018Q4-base, pkgsrc-2018Q4, pkgsrc-2018Q3-base, pkgsrc-2018Q3, pkgsrc-2018Q2-base, pkgsrc-2018Q2, pkgsrc-2018Q1-base, pkgsrc-2018Q1, pkgsrc-2017Q4-base, pkgsrc-2017Q4, pkgsrc-2017Q3-base, pkgsrc-2017Q3, pkgsrc-2017Q2-base, pkgsrc-2017Q2, pkgsrc-2017Q1-base, pkgsrc-2017Q1
Diff to: previous 1.18: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.18: +1 -3 lines
GC deprecated logic for openssh without /dev/urandom. This option is no longer
supported by OpenSSH.

Revision 1.18: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Mar 15 20:54:07 2016 UTC (10 years, 8 months ago) by bsiegert
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2016Q4-base, pkgsrc-2016Q4, pkgsrc-2016Q3-base, pkgsrc-2016Q3, pkgsrc-2016Q2-base, pkgsrc-2016Q2, pkgsrc-2016Q1-base, pkgsrc-2016Q1
Diff to: previous 1.17: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.17: +1 -3 lines
Update openssh to 7.2.2 (7.2p2).

Changes since OpenSSH 7.2p1
===========================

This release fixes a security bug:

 * sshd(8): sanitise X11 authentication credentials to avoid xauth
   command injection when X11Forwarding is enabled.

   Full details of the vulnerability are available at:
   http://www.openssh.com/txt/x11fwd.adv

Revision 1.16.12.1: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Mon Aug 24 19:06:40 2015 UTC (11 years, 2 months ago) by tron
Branches: pkgsrc-2015Q2
Diff to: previous 1.16: preferred, colored; next MAIN 1.17: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.16: +2 -1 lines
Pullup ticket #4796 - requested by wiz
security/openssh: security update

Revisions pulled up:
- security/openssh/Makefile					patch
- security/openssh/PLIST					patch
- security/openssh/distinfo					patch
- security/openssh/files/org.openssh.sshd.sb.in			patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-auth2-chall.c			patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-auth2.c			patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c			patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_bsd-openpty.c	patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sandbox-darwin.c		patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sftp-common.c			patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c				patch
- security/openssh/patches/patch-uidswap.c			patch

---
   Module Name:	pkgsrc
   Committed By:	wiz
   Date:		Fri Aug 21 08:12:09 UTC 2015

   Modified Files:
   	pkgsrc/security/openssh: Makefile distinfo
   Removed Files:
   	pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches: patch-auth2-chall.c

   Log Message:
   Update to 7.1p1:

   Changes since OpenSSH 7.0
   =========================

   This is a bugfix release.

   Security
   --------

    * sshd(8): OpenSSH 7.0 contained a logic error in PermitRootLogin=
      prohibit-password/without-password that could, depending on
      compile-time configuration, permit password authentication to
      root while preventing other forms of authentication. This problem
      was reported by Mantas Mikulenas.

   Bugfixes
   --------

    * ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatability workarounds for FuTTY

    * ssh(1), sshd(8): refine compatability workarounds for WinSCP

    * Fix a number of memory faults (double-free, free of uninitialised
      memory, etc) in ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1). Reported by Mateusz
      Kocielski.

Revision 1.17: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Fri Aug 14 08:57:00 2015 UTC (11 years, 3 months ago) by jperkin
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2015Q4-base, pkgsrc-2015Q4, pkgsrc-2015Q3-base, pkgsrc-2015Q3
Diff to: previous 1.16: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.16: +2 -1 lines
Fix a bug introduced 9 years ago in patch-sshd.c which has meant that
privilege separation has been disabled all that time.  The logic was changed
such that it was only enabled on Interix, instead of only being disabled on
Interix as originally intended.

While here, pull in patches from MacPorts to enable privsep on Darwin.

Bump PKGREVISION.

Revision 1.16: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Sat Mar 29 09:38:11 2014 UTC (12 years, 7 months ago) by taca
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2015Q2-base, pkgsrc-2015Q1-base, pkgsrc-2015Q1, pkgsrc-2014Q4-base, pkgsrc-2014Q4, pkgsrc-2014Q3-base, pkgsrc-2014Q3, pkgsrc-2014Q2-base, pkgsrc-2014Q2, pkgsrc-2014Q1-base, pkgsrc-2014Q1
Branch point for: pkgsrc-2015Q2
Diff to: previous 1.15: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.15: +4 -1 lines
Update openssh to 6.6.1 (OpenSSH 6.6p1).

pkgsrc change

    * Use PLIST_VARS.
    * Update hpn-patch based on openssh-6.5p1-hpnssh14v4.diff.gz.

Fixes security problem (SA57488).

For full changes, please refer below release notes.

	http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.5
	http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6

Revision 1.15: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Mar 11 14:05:13 2014 UTC (12 years, 8 months ago) by jperkin
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.14: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.14: +1 -2 lines
Remove example rc.d scripts from PLISTs.

These are now handled dynamically if INIT_SYSTEM is set to "rc.d", or
ignored otherwise.

Revision 1.14: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Fri Jun 11 20:41:41 2010 UTC (16 years, 5 months ago) by martti
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2013Q4-base, pkgsrc-2013Q4, pkgsrc-2013Q3-base, pkgsrc-2013Q3, pkgsrc-2013Q2-base, pkgsrc-2013Q2, pkgsrc-2013Q1-base, pkgsrc-2013Q1, pkgsrc-2012Q4-base, pkgsrc-2012Q4, pkgsrc-2012Q3-base, pkgsrc-2012Q3, pkgsrc-2012Q2-base, pkgsrc-2012Q2, pkgsrc-2012Q1-base, pkgsrc-2012Q1, pkgsrc-2011Q4-base, pkgsrc-2011Q4, pkgsrc-2011Q3-base, pkgsrc-2011Q3, pkgsrc-2011Q2-base, pkgsrc-2011Q2, pkgsrc-2011Q1-base, pkgsrc-2011Q1, pkgsrc-2010Q4-base, pkgsrc-2010Q4, pkgsrc-2010Q3-base, pkgsrc-2010Q3, pkgsrc-2010Q2-base, pkgsrc-2010Q2
Diff to: previous 1.13: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.13: +3 -1 lines
Updated security/openssh to 5.5.1

Lots of changes, including

 * After a transition period of about 10 years, this release disables
   SSH protocol 1 by default. Clients and servers that need to use the
   legacy protocol must explicitly enable it in ssh_config / sshd_config
   or on the command-line.

 * Remove the libsectok/OpenSC-based smartcard code and add support for
   PKCS#11 tokens. This support is automatically enabled on all
   platforms that support dlopen(3) and was inspired by patches written
   by Alon Bar-Lev. Details in the ssh(1) and ssh-add(1) manpages.

 * Add support for certificate authentication of users and hosts using a
   new, minimal OpenSSH certificate format (not X.509). Certificates
   contain a public key, identity information and some validity
   constraints and are signed with a standard SSH public key using
   ssh-keygen(1). CA keys may be marked as trusted in authorized_keys
   or via a TrustedUserCAKeys option in sshd_config(5) (for user
   authentication), or in known_hosts (for host authentication).

   Documentation for certificate support may be found in ssh-keygen(1),
   sshd(8) and ssh(1) and a description of the protocol extensions in
   PROTOCOL.certkeys.

 * Added a 'netcat mode' to ssh(1): "ssh -W host:port ..." This connects
   stdio on the client to a single port forward on the server. This
   allows, for example, using ssh as a ProxyCommand to route connections
   via intermediate servers. bz#1618

Revision 1.13: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Sun Jun 14 18:13:34 2009 UTC (17 years, 5 months ago) by joerg
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2010Q1-base, pkgsrc-2010Q1, pkgsrc-2009Q4-base, pkgsrc-2009Q4, pkgsrc-2009Q3-base, pkgsrc-2009Q3, pkgsrc-2009Q2-base, pkgsrc-2009Q2
Diff to: previous 1.12: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.12: +1 -2 lines
Remove @dirrm entries from PLISTs

Revision 1.12: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Sep 16 12:53:08 2008 UTC (18 years, 2 months ago) by taca
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2009Q1-base, pkgsrc-2009Q1, pkgsrc-2008Q4-base, pkgsrc-2008Q4, pkgsrc-2008Q3-base, pkgsrc-2008Q3
Diff to: previous 1.11: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.11: +2 -1 lines
Update openssh package to 5.1.1 (5.1p1)

Changes from OpenSSH 5.0 is huge to write here, please refer its
release note: http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1.
I quote only Security section from the release note.

Security:

 * sshd(8): Avoid X11 man-in-the-middle attack on HP/UX (and possibly
   other platforms) when X11UseLocalhost=no

   When attempting to bind(2) to a port that has previously been bound
   with SO_REUSEADDR set, most operating systems check that either the
   effective user-id matches the previous bind (common on BSD-derived
   systems) or that the bind addresses do not overlap (Linux and
   Solaris).

   Some operating systems, such as HP/UX, do not perform these checks
   and are vulnerable to an X11 man-in-the-middle attack when the
   sshd_config(5) option X11UseLocalhost has been set to "no" - an
   attacker may establish a more-specific bind, which will be used in
   preference to sshd's wildcard listener.

   Modern BSD operating systems, Linux, OS X and Solaris implement the
   above checks and are not vulnerable to this attack, nor are systems
   where the X11UseLocalhost has been left at the default value of
   "yes".

   Portable OpenSSH 5.1 avoids this problem for all operating systems
   by not setting SO_REUSEADDR when X11UseLocalhost is set to no.

   This vulnerability was reported by sway2004009 AT hotmail.com.

Revision 1.11: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Thu Jul 28 16:31:13 2005 UTC (21 years, 3 months ago) by reed
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2008Q2-base, pkgsrc-2008Q2, pkgsrc-2008Q1-base, pkgsrc-2008Q1, pkgsrc-2007Q4-base, pkgsrc-2007Q4, pkgsrc-2007Q3-base, pkgsrc-2007Q3, pkgsrc-2007Q2-base, pkgsrc-2007Q2, pkgsrc-2007Q1-base, pkgsrc-2007Q1, pkgsrc-2006Q4-base, pkgsrc-2006Q4, pkgsrc-2006Q3-base, pkgsrc-2006Q3, pkgsrc-2006Q2-base, pkgsrc-2006Q2, pkgsrc-2006Q1-base, pkgsrc-2006Q1, pkgsrc-2005Q4-base, pkgsrc-2005Q4, pkgsrc-2005Q3-base, pkgsrc-2005Q3, cwrapper, cube-native-xorg-base, cube-native-xorg
Diff to: previous 1.10: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.10: +14 -14 lines
My fix from eight days ago was broken. Add the "man" subdirectory
for the man entries.

Revision 1.10: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Wed Jul 20 05:27:14 2005 UTC (21 years, 4 months ago) by reed
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.9: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.9: +14 -14 lines
Remove MANDIR variable and just use "man" instead.

Revision 1.9: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Mon May 2 20:34:05 2005 UTC (21 years, 6 months ago) by reed
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2005Q2-base, pkgsrc-2005Q2
Diff to: previous 1.8: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.8: +2 -1 lines
RCD_SCRIPTS_EXAMPLEDIR is no longer customizable.
And always is defined as share/examples/rc.d
which was the default before.

This rc.d scripts are not automatically added to PLISTs now also.
So add to each corresponding PLIST as required.

This was discussed on tech-pkg in late January and late April.

Todo: remove the RCD_SCRIPTS_EXAMPLEDIR uses in MESSAGES and elsewhere
and remove the RCD_SCRIPTS_EXAMPLEDIR itself.

Revision 1.8: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Fri Apr 23 22:07:58 2004 UTC (22 years, 6 months ago) by reed
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgsrc-2005Q1-base, pkgsrc-2005Q1, pkgsrc-2004Q4-base, pkgsrc-2004Q4, pkgsrc-2004Q3-base, pkgsrc-2004Q3, pkgsrc-2004Q2-base, pkgsrc-2004Q2
Diff to: previous 1.7: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.7: +1 -2 lines
mk/bsd.pkg.install.mk now automatically registers
the RCD_SCRIPTS rc.d script(s) to the PLIST.

This GENERATE_PLIST idea is part of Greg A. Woods'
PR #22954.

This helps when the RC_SCRIPTS are installed to
a different ${RCD_SCRIPTS_EXAMPLEDIR}. (Later,
the default RCD_SCRIPTS_EXAMPLEDIR will be changed
to be more clear that they are the examples.)

These patches also remove the etc/rc.d/ scripts from PLISTs
(of packages that use RCD_SCRIPTS). (This also removes
now unused references from openssh* makefiles. Note that
qmail package has not been changed yet.)

I have been doing automatic PLIST registration for RC_SCRIPTS
for over a year. Not all of these packages have been tested,
but many have been tested and used.

Somethings maybe to do:
- a few packages still manually install the rc.d scripts to
  hard-coded etc/rc.d. These need to be fixed.
- maybe  remove from mk/${OPSYS}.pkg.dist mtree specifications too.

Revision 1.7: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Fri Jun 28 17:10:17 2002 UTC (24 years, 4 months ago) by jlam
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: pkgviews-base, pkgviews, pkgsrc-2004Q1-base, pkgsrc-2004Q1, pkgsrc-2003Q4-base, pkgsrc-2003Q4, netbsd-1-6-RELEASE-base, netbsd-1-6-1-base, netbsd-1-6-1, netbsd-1-6
Diff to: previous 1.6: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.6: +15 -16 lines
Add ability to update the in-tree OpenSSH directly from pkgsrc.  This
installs the binaries directly in /usr and places the manpages and example
files in the correct hier(7) locations.  We don't register installation in
this case because the package database can't handle it.  We deal with the
ssh config files and directories as follows:

	NetBSD-1.5.*	use /etc/ssh_config, /etc/sshd_config
	NetBSD-1.6	use /etc/ssh/ssh_config, /etc/ssh/sshd_config

We also emit a warning in the MESSAGE file that /etc/ssh.conf and
/etc/sshd.conf should be renamed in order to keep using them.  Lastly,
there is a new target "tarball" to generate a tarball of the installed
files that might be used to install quickly on many machines, though it
may be only of limited utility.

These changes are only active if UPDATE_INTREE_OPENSSH is defined.

Revision 1.6: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Wed Jun 26 10:29:59 2002 UTC (24 years, 4 months ago) by seb
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.5: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.5: +2 -2 lines
Substitute a couple of `mkdir' by `${MKDIR}'.
Remove `-p' from mkdir arguments, it is already part of ${MKDIR}.
While here substitute a couple of ${PREFIX} by `%D' in
`@exec ${MKDIR} ...' lines and add a couple of missing `%D' in such lines too!

Revision 1.5: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Wed Jun 26 08:59:45 2002 UTC (24 years, 4 months ago) by itojun
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.4: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.4: +2 -2 lines
need -p

Revision 1.4: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Wed Jun 26 08:57:18 2002 UTC (24 years, 4 months ago) by itojun
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.3: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.3: +2 -2 lines
use ${MKDIR}

Revision 1.3: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Jun 25 02:13:12 2002 UTC (24 years, 4 months ago) by itojun
Branches: MAIN
Diff to: previous 1.2: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.2: +6 -1 lines
upgrade to 3.3p1, with privilege separation enabled.

(the following change may include pre-3.2.3p1 change)

20020622
 - (djm) Update README.privsep; spotted by fries@
 - (djm) Release 3.3p1

20020621
 - (djm) Sync:
   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/21 05:50:51
     [monitor.c]
     Don't initialise compression buffers when compression=no in sshd_config;
     ok Niels@
  - ID sync for auth-passwd.c
 - (djm) Warn and disable compression on platforms which can't handle both
   useprivilegeseparation=yes and compression=yes
 - (djm) contrib/redhat/openssh.spec hacking:
   - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
   - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
   - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client

20020620
 - (bal) Fixed AIX environment handling, use setpcred() instead of existing
   code.  (Bugzilla Bug 261)
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/14 21:35:00
     [monitor_wrap.c]
     spelling; from Brian Poole <raj@cerias.purdue.edu>
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/15 00:01:36
     [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
     break agent key lifetime protocol and allow other contraints for key
     usage.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/15 00:07:38
     [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
     fix stupid typo
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/15 01:27:48
     [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
     remove the CONSTRAIN_IDENTITY messages and introduce a new
     ADD_ID message with contraints instead. contraints can be
     only added together with the private key.
   - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/16 21:30:58
     [ssh-keyscan.c]
     use TAILQ_xx macro.  from lukem@netbsd.  markus ok
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/17 06:05:56
     [scp.c]
     make usage like man page
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/19 00:27:55
     [auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-none.c authfd.c
      authfd.h monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c radix.c readconf.c scp.c sftp.1
      ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c
      ssh-keysign.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c ttymodes.c
      xmalloc.h]
     KNF done automatically while reading....
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/19 18:01:00
     [cipher.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h]
     make the monitor sync the transfer ssh1 session key;
     transfer keycontext only for RC4 (this is still depends on EVP
     implementation details and is broken).
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 19:56:07
     [ssh.1 sshd.8]
     move configuration file options from ssh.1/sshd.8 to
     ssh_config.5/sshd_config.5; ok deraadt@ millert@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 20:00:05
     [scp.1 sftp.1]
     ssh_config(5)
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 20:03:34
     [ssh_config sshd_config]
     refer to config file man page
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 23:05:56
     [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.c]
     allow Compression=yes/no in sshd_config
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 23:37:12
     [sshd_config]
     add Compression
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/25 20:40:08
     [LICENCE]
     missed Per Allansson (auth2-chall.c)
 - (bal) Cygwin special handling of empty passwords wrong.  Patch by
   vinschen@redhat.com
 - (bal) Missed integrating ssh_config.5 and sshd_config.5
 - (bal) Still more Makefile.in updates for ssh{d}_config.5

20020613
 - (bal) typo of setgroup for cygwin.  Patch by vinschen@redhat.com

20020612
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 23:03:54
     [ssh.c]
     remove unused cruft.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/12 01:09:52
     [ssh.c]
     ssh_connect returns 0 on success
 - (bal) Build noop setgroups() for cygwin to clean up code (For other
   platforms without the setgroups() requirement, you MUST define
   SETGROUPS_NOOP in the configure.ac) Based on patch by vinschen@redhat.com
 - (bal) Some platforms don't have ONLCR (Notable Mint)

20020611
 - (bal) ssh-agent.c RCSD fix (|unexpand already done)
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 22:15:15
     [ssh.1]
     update for no setuid root and ssh-keysign; ok deraadt@
   - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 22:17:21
     [sshconnect.c]
     pass salen to sockaddr_ntop so that we are happy on linux/solaris
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:53:06
     [auth-rsa.c ssh-rsa.c]
     display minimum RSA modulus in error(); ok markus@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:56:30
     [ssh-keysign.8]
     merge in stuff from my man page; ok markus@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 17:36:23
     [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
     use convtime() to parse and validate key lifetime.  can now
     use '-t 2h' etc.  ok markus@ provos@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 17:45:20
     [readconf.c ssh.1]
     change RhostsRSAAuthentication and RhostsAuthentication default to no
     since ssh is no longer setuid root by default; ok markus@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 21:21:10
     [ssh_config]
     update defaults for RhostsRSAAuthentication and RhostsAuthentication
     here too (all options commented out with default value).
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 22:28:41
     [channels.c channels.h session.c]
     move creation of agent socket to session.c; no need for uidswapping
     in channel.c.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 04:14:26
     [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
     no longer use uidswap.[ch] from the ssh client
     run less code with euid==0 if ssh is installed setuid root
     just switch the euid, don't switch the complete set of groups
     (this is only needed by sshd). ok provos@
   - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 05:46:20
     [auth-krb4.c monitor.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c sshd.c]
     pid_t cleanup. Markus need this now to keep hacking.
     markus@, millert@ ok
   - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 08:11:45
     [canohost.c]
     use "ntop" only after initialized
 - (bal) Cygwin fix up from swap uid clean up in ssh.c patch by
   vinschen@redhat.com

20020609
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:07:56
     [ssh.c]
     nuke ptrace comment
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:07:09
     [ssh-keysign.c]
     only accept 20 byte session ids
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:17:01
     [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c]
     deprecate FallBackToRsh and UseRsh; patch from djm@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:40:01
     [readconf.c]
     just warn about Deprecated options for now
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:41:18
     [ssh_config]
     remove FallBackToRsh/UseRsh
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 12:36:53
     [scp.c]
     remove FallBackToRsh
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 12:46:14
     [readconf.c]
     silently ignore deprecated options, since FallBackToRsh might be passed
     by remote scp commands.
  - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 21:15:27
     [sshconnect.c]
     always use getnameinfo.  (diag message only)
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 04:33:27
     [sshconnect.c]
     abort() - > fatal()
 - (bal) RCSID tag updates on channels.c, clientloop.c, nchan.c,
   sftp-client.c, ssh-agenet.c, ssh-keygen.c and connect.h (we did unexpand
   independant of them)

20020607
 - (bal) Removed --{enable/disable}-suid-ssh
 - (bal) Missed __progname in ssh-keysign.c  patch by dtucker@zip.com.au
 - (bal) use 'LOGIN_PROGRAM'  not '/usr/bin/login' in session.c patch by
   Bertrand.Velle@apogee-com.fr

20020606
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 21:56:38
     [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config]
     re-enable privsep and disable setuid for post-3.2.2
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/16 22:02:50
     [cipher.c kex.h mac.c]
     fix warnings (openssl 0.9.7 requires const)
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/16 22:09:59
     [session.c ssh.c]
     don't limit xauth pathlen on client side and longer print length on
     server when debug; ok markus@
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/19 20:54:52
     [log.h]
     extra commas in enum not 100% portable
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/22 23:18:25
     [ssh.c sshd.c]
     spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/23 19:24:30
     [authfile.c authfile.h pathnames.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h
      sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh-keysign.c Makefile.in]
     add /usr/libexec/ssh-keysign: a setuid helper program for hostbased
     authentication in protocol v2 (needs to access the hostkeys).
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/23 19:39:34
     [ssh.c]
     add comment about ssh-keysign
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/24 08:45:14
     [sshconnect2.c]
     stat ssh-keysign first, print error if stat fails;
     some debug->error; fix comment
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/25 08:50:39
     [sshconnect2.c]
     execlp->execl; from stevesk
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/25 18:51:07
     [auth.h auth2.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c
      auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c Makefile.in]
     split auth2.c into one file per method; ok provos@/deraadt@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/26 20:35:10
     [ssh.1]
     sort ChallengeResponseAuthentication; ok markus@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 16:45:27
     [monitor_mm.c]
     print strerror(errno) on mmap/munmap error; ok markus@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 17:28:02
     [uidswap.c]
     format spec change/casts and some KNF; ok markus@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 21:24:00
     [uidswap.c]
     use correct function name in fatal()
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/29 03:06:30
     [ssh.1 sshd.8]
     spelling
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/29 11:21:57
     [sshd.c]
     don't start if privsep is enabled and SSH_PRIVSEP_USER or
     _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR are missing; ok deraadt@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/30 08:07:31
     [cipher.c]
     use rijndael/aes from libcrypto (openssl >= 0.9.7) instead of
     our own implementation. allow use of AES hardware via libcrypto,
     ok deraadt@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 10:30:33
     [sshconnect2.c]
     extent ssh-keysign protocol:
     pass # of socket-fd to ssh-keysign, keysign verfies locally used
     ip-address using this socket-fd, restricts fake local hostnames
     to actual local hostnames; ok stevesk@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 11:35:15
     [auth.h auth2.c]
     move Authmethod definitons to per-method file.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:16:48
     [key.c]
     add comment:
     key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature
     and -1 on error.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:20:50
     [ssh-rsa.c]
     pad received signature with leading zeros, because RSA_verify expects
     a signature of RSA_size. the drafts says the signature is transmitted
     unpadded (e.g. putty does not pad), reported by anakin@pobox.com
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/03 12:04:07
     [ssh.h]
     compatiblity -> compatibility
     decriptor -> descriptor
     authentciated -> authenticated
     transmition -> transmission
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:42:35
     [monitor.c]
     only allow enabled authentication methods; ok provos@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:53:40
     [monitor.c]
     save the session id (hash) for ssh2 (it will be passed with the
     initial sign request) and verify that this value is used during
     authentication; ok provos@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 23:02:06
     [packet.c]
     remove __FUNCTION__
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 23:05:49
     [cipher.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c]
     __FUNCTION__ -> __func__
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 16:08:07
     [ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c]
     '-a bind_address' binds the agent to user-specified unix-domain
     socket instead of /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid>; ok djm@ (some time ago).
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 16:08:07
     [ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c]
     '-a bind_address' binds the agent to user-specified unix-domain
     socket instead of /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid>; ok djm@ (some time ago).
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 16:48:54
     [ssh-agent.c]
     copy current request into an extra buffer and just flush this
     request on errors, ok provos@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 19:57:12
     [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
     ssh-add -x for lock and -X for unlocking the agent.
     todo: encrypt private keys with locked...
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 20:56:39
     [ssh-add.c]
     add -x/-X to usage
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 21:55:44
     [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
     ssh-add -t life,  Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities;
     ok provos@
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/06 01:09:41
     [monitor.h]
     no trailing comma in enum; china@thewrittenword.com
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/06 17:12:44
     [sftp-server.c]
     discard remaining bytes of current request; ok provos@
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/06 17:30:11
     [sftp-server.c]
     use get_int() macro (hide iqueue)
 - (bal) Missed msg.[ch] in merge.  Required for ssh-keysign.
 - (bal) Forgot to add msg.c Makefile.in.
 - (bal) monitor_mm.c typos.
 - (bal) Refixed auth2.c.  It was never fully commited while spliting out
   authentication to different files.
 - (bal) ssh-keysign should build and install correctly now.  Phase two
   would be to clean out any dead wood and disable ssh setuid on install.
 - (bal) Reverse logic, use __func__ first since it's C99

20020604
 - (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed
   setsockopt from debug to error for now).

20020527
 - (tim) [configure.ac.orig monitor_fdpass.c] Enahnce msghdr tests to address
   build problem on Irix reported by Dave Love <d.love@dl.ac.uk>. Back out
   last monitor_fdpass.c changes that are no longer needed with new tests.
   Patch tested on Irix by Jan-Frode Myklebust <janfrode@parallab.uib.no>

20020522
 - (djm) Fix spelling mistakes, spotted by Solar Designer i
   <solar@openwall.com>
 - Sync scard/ (not sure when it drifted)
 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync:
   [auth.c]
   Fix typo/thinko.  Pass in as to auth_approval(), not NULL.
   Closes PR 2659.
 - Crank version
 - Crank RPM spec versions

20020521
 - (stevesk) [sshd.c] bug 245; disable setsid() for now
 - (stevesk) [sshd.c] #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN for setgroups()

20020517
 - (tim) [configure.ac] remove extra MD5_MSG="no" line.

20020515
 - (bal) CVS ID fix up on auth-passwd.c
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/07 19:54:36
     [ssh.h]
     use ssh uid
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/08 21:06:34
     [ssh.h]
     move to sshd.sshd instead
   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/11 20:24:48
     [ssh.h]
     typo in comment
   - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 02:37:39
     [auth-skey.c auth2.c]
     less warnings.  skey_{respond,query} are public (in auth.h)
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 20:44:58
     [auth-options.c auth.c auth.h]
     move the packet_send_debug handling from auth-options.c to auth.c;
     ok provos@
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 15:53:19
     [sshd.c]
     Call setsid() in the child after sshd accepts the connection and forks.
     This is needed for privsep which calls setlogin() when it changes uids.
     Without this, there is a race where the login name of an existing
     connection, as returned by getlogin(), may be changed to the privsep
     user (sshd).  markus@ OK
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 21:26:49
     [auth-rhosts.c]
     handle debug messages during rhosts-rsa and hostbased authentication;
     ok provos@
   - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 15:47:49
     [kex.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c sshd.c]
     'monitor' variable clashes with at least one lame platform (NeXT).  i
     Renamed to 'pmonitor'.  provos@
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/04 02:39:35
     [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config]
     enable privsep by default; provos ok
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/06 23:34:33
     [ssh.1 sshd.8]
     Kill/adjust r(login|exec)d? references now that those are no longer in
     the tree.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 21:02:53
     [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config]
     disable privsep and enable setuid for the 3.2.2 release
 - (bal) Fixed up PAM case.  I think.
 - (bal) Clarified openbsd-compat/*-cray.* Licence provided by Wendy
 - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 21:05:29
     [version.h]
     enter OpenSSH_3.2.2
 - (bal) Caldara, Suse, and Redhat openssh.specs updated.

Revision 1.2: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Tue Feb 5 04:17:31 2002 UTC (24 years, 9 months ago) by jlam
Branches: MAIN
CVS tags: netbsd-1-5-PATCH003, buildlink2-base, buildlink2
Diff to: previous 1.1: preferred, colored
Changes since revision 1.1: +2 -2 lines
* SSH_CONF_DIR has been obsoleted.  Use PKG_SYSCONFDIR instead.
* Build properly on systems that don't have /dev/urandom by testing for
  the presence of /dev/urandom, instead of just testing for Solaris.
* Add disabled code to handle PAM (not quite working yet with security/PAM).
* Make the sshd rc.d script more /etc/rc.subr-friendly.
* Minimize amount of diffs from pristine OpenSSH sources.

Revision 1.1: download - view: text, markup, annotated - select for diffs
Thu Nov 1 01:17:04 2001 UTC (25 years ago) by zuntum
Branches: MAIN
Move pkg/ files into package's toplevel directory

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