version 1.43, 2001/10/15 09:51:17 |
version 1.45, 2001/10/24 06:36:38 |
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#ifdef INET |
#ifdef INET |
#include <netinet/ip.h> |
#include <netinet/ip.h> |
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h> |
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h> |
#endif /*INET*/ |
#endif /* INET */ |
#include <netinet/ip6.h> |
#include <netinet/ip6.h> |
#include <netinet6/in6_var.h> |
#include <netinet6/in6_var.h> |
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> |
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> |
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/* we need it for NLOOP. */ |
/* we need it for NLOOP. */ |
#include "loop.h" |
#include "loop.h" |
#include "faith.h" |
#include "faith.h" |
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#include "gif.h" |
#include "gif.h" |
#include "bpfilter.h" |
#include "bpfilter.h" |
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#endif |
#endif |
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/* |
/* |
* mbuf statistics by kazu |
* mbuf statistics |
*/ |
*/ |
if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) { |
if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) { |
if (m->m_next) |
if (m->m_next) |
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#define M2MMAX (sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m)/sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[0])) |
#define M2MMAX (sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m)/sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[0])) |
if (m->m_next) { |
if (m->m_next) { |
if (m->m_flags & M_LOOP) { |
if (m->m_flags & M_LOOP) { |
ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[loif[0].if_index]++; /*XXX*/ |
ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[loif[0].if_index]++; /* XXX */ |
} else if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index < M2MMAX) |
} else if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index < M2MMAX) |
ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index]++; |
ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index]++; |
else |
else |
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} |
} |
#endif /* PFIL_HOOKS */ |
#endif /* PFIL_HOOKS */ |
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ip6stat.ip6s_nxthist[ip6->ip6_nxt]++; |
ip6stat.ip6s_nxthist[ip6->ip6_nxt]++; |
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#ifdef ALTQ |
#ifdef ALTQ |
/* XXX Temporary until ALTQ is changed to use a pfil hook */ |
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if (altq_input != NULL && (*altq_input)(m, AF_INET6) == 0) { |
if (altq_input != NULL && (*altq_input)(m, AF_INET6) == 0) { |
/* packet is dropped by traffic conditioner */ |
/* packet is dropped by traffic conditioner */ |
return; |
return; |
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#endif |
#endif |
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/* |
/* |
* Scope check |
* Check against address spoofing/corruption. |
*/ |
*/ |
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src) || |
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src) || |
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { |
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { |
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goto bad; |
goto bad; |
} |
} |
/* |
/* |
* The following check is not documented in the spec. Malicious party |
* The following check is not documented in specs. A malicious |
* may be able to use IPv4 mapped addr to confuse tcp/udp stack and |
* party may be able to use IPv4 mapped addr to confuse tcp/udp stack |
* bypass security checks (act as if it was from 127.0.0.1 by using |
* and bypass security checks (act as if it was from 127.0.0.1 by using |
* IPv6 src ::ffff:127.0.0.1). Be cautious. |
* IPv6 src ::ffff:127.0.0.1). Be cautious. |
* |
* |
* This check chokes if we are in SIIT cloud. As none of BSDs support |
* This check chokes if we are in an SIIT cloud. As none of BSDs |
* IPv4-less kernel compilation, we cannot support SIIT environment |
* support IPv4-less kernel compilation, we cannot support SIIT |
* at all. So, it makes more sense for us to reject any malicious |
* environment at all. So, it makes more sense for us to reject any |
* packets for non-SIIT environment, than try to do a partical support |
* malicious packets for non-SIIT environment, than try to do a |
* for SIIT environment. |
* partical support for SIIT environment. |
*/ |
*/ |
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_src) || |
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_src) || |
IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { |
IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { |
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&& ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp->if_type == IFT_FAITH) { |
&& ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp->if_type == IFT_FAITH) { |
/* XXX do we need more sanity checks? */ |
/* XXX do we need more sanity checks? */ |
ours = 1; |
ours = 1; |
deliverifp = ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp; /*faith*/ |
deliverifp = ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp; /* faith */ |
goto hbhcheck; |
goto hbhcheck; |
} |
} |
} |
} |