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Diff for /src/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c between version 1.43 and 1.45

version 1.43, 2001/10/15 09:51:17 version 1.45, 2001/10/24 06:36:38
Line 97 
Line 97 
 #ifdef INET  #ifdef INET
 #include <netinet/ip.h>  #include <netinet/ip.h>
 #include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>  #include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
 #endif /*INET*/  #endif /* INET */
 #include <netinet/ip6.h>  #include <netinet/ip6.h>
 #include <netinet6/in6_var.h>  #include <netinet6/in6_var.h>
 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>  #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
Line 116 
Line 116 
 /* we need it for NLOOP. */  /* we need it for NLOOP. */
 #include "loop.h"  #include "loop.h"
 #include "faith.h"  #include "faith.h"
   
 #include "gif.h"  #include "gif.h"
 #include "bpfilter.h"  #include "bpfilter.h"
   
Line 250  ip6_input(m)
Line 249  ip6_input(m)
 #endif  #endif
   
         /*          /*
          * mbuf statistics by kazu           * mbuf statistics
          */           */
         if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {          if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {
                 if (m->m_next)                  if (m->m_next)
Line 261  ip6_input(m)
Line 260  ip6_input(m)
 #define M2MMAX  (sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m)/sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[0]))  #define M2MMAX  (sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m)/sizeof(ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[0]))
                 if (m->m_next) {                  if (m->m_next) {
                         if (m->m_flags & M_LOOP) {                          if (m->m_flags & M_LOOP) {
                                 ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[loif[0].if_index]++;   /*XXX*/                                  ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[loif[0].if_index]++; /* XXX */
                         } else if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index < M2MMAX)                          } else if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index < M2MMAX)
                                 ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index]++;                                  ip6stat.ip6s_m2m[m->m_pkthdr.rcvif->if_index]++;
                         else                          else
Line 324  ip6_input(m)
Line 323  ip6_input(m)
         }          }
 #endif /* PFIL_HOOKS */  #endif /* PFIL_HOOKS */
   
   
         ip6stat.ip6s_nxthist[ip6->ip6_nxt]++;          ip6stat.ip6s_nxthist[ip6->ip6_nxt]++;
   
 #ifdef ALTQ  #ifdef ALTQ
         /* XXX Temporary until ALTQ is changed to use a pfil hook */  
         if (altq_input != NULL && (*altq_input)(m, AF_INET6) == 0) {          if (altq_input != NULL && (*altq_input)(m, AF_INET6) == 0) {
                 /* packet is dropped by traffic conditioner */                  /* packet is dropped by traffic conditioner */
                 return;                  return;
Line 336  ip6_input(m)
Line 333  ip6_input(m)
 #endif  #endif
   
         /*          /*
          * Scope check           * Check against address spoofing/corruption.
          */           */
         if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src) ||          if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src) ||
             IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {              IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
Line 345  ip6_input(m)
Line 342  ip6_input(m)
                 goto bad;                  goto bad;
         }          }
         /*          /*
          * The following check is not documented in the spec.  Malicious party           * The following check is not documented in specs.  A malicious
          * may be able to use IPv4 mapped addr to confuse tcp/udp stack and           * party may be able to use IPv4 mapped addr to confuse tcp/udp stack
          * bypass security checks (act as if it was from 127.0.0.1 by using           * and bypass security checks (act as if it was from 127.0.0.1 by using
          * IPv6 src ::ffff:127.0.0.1).  Be cautious.           * IPv6 src ::ffff:127.0.0.1).  Be cautious.
          *           *
          * This check chokes if we are in SIIT cloud.  As none of BSDs support           * This check chokes if we are in an SIIT cloud.  As none of BSDs
          * IPv4-less kernel compilation, we cannot support SIIT environment           * support IPv4-less kernel compilation, we cannot support SIIT
          * at all.  So, it makes more sense for us to reject any malicious           * environment at all.  So, it makes more sense for us to reject any
          * packets for non-SIIT environment, than try to do a partical support           * malicious packets for non-SIIT environment, than try to do a
          * for SIIT environment.           * partical support for SIIT environment.
          */           */
         if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_src) ||          if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_src) ||
             IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {              IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
Line 543  ip6_input(m)
Line 540  ip6_input(m)
                  && ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp->if_type == IFT_FAITH) {                   && ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp->if_type == IFT_FAITH) {
                         /* XXX do we need more sanity checks? */                          /* XXX do we need more sanity checks? */
                         ours = 1;                          ours = 1;
                         deliverifp = ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp; /*faith*/                          deliverifp = ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_ifp; /* faith */
                         goto hbhcheck;                          goto hbhcheck;
                 }                  }
         }          }

Legend:
Removed from v.1.43  
changed lines
  Added in v.1.45

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