src/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c - diff

Return to ip6_input.c CVS log

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version 1.24, 2000/07/02 09:56:39

version 1.25, 2000/07/06 12:36:19

Line 446 ip6_input(m)

(ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt->rt_flags & RTF_UP) != 0 &&

IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6->ip6_dst,

&ip6_forward_rt.ro_dst.sin6_addr))

; /* cache hit */

ip6stat.ip6s_forward_cachehit++;

else {

if (ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt) {

/* route is down or destination is different */

ip6stat.ip6s_forward_cachemiss++;

RTFREE(ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt);

ip6_forward_rt.ro_rt = 0;

}

Line 665 ip6_input(m)

Line 666 ip6_input(m)

return;

}

ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);

* Malicious party may be able to use IPv4 mapped addr to confuse

* tcp/udp stack and bypass security checks (act as if it was from

* 127.0.0.1 by using IPv6 src ::ffff:127.0.0.1). Be cautious.

* For SIIT end node behavior, you may want to disable the check.

* However, you will become vulnerable to attacks using IPv4 mapped

* source.

if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_src) ||

IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {

ip6stat.ip6s_badscope++;

in6_ifstat_inc(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, ifs6_in_addrerr);

goto bad;

}

* Tell launch routine the next header